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ABSTRACT 
Inefficient Redistribution and Inefficient Redistributive Politics  
by Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson * 
This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson’s (1993) 
model of redistributive politics. Regardless of the absolute levels of the 
efficiency of political parties’ transfers to different voter segments, parties have 
incentive to (stochastically) shift resources away from voter segments with large 
relative efficiency gaps between the two parties’ transfers towards voter 
segments with smaller relative efficiency gaps. Because of this dependence on 
relative, and not absolute, levels of efficiency, the parties’ optimal strategies 
may lead to large discrepancies between the sum of the budgetary transfers 
and the sum of the effective transfers. At the extreme, in the spirit of Magee, 
Brock, and Young (1989), we obtain „black hole” inefficiency. When the model 
is extended to allow for loyal voter segments and loyalty to a party is positively 
related to the efficiency of that party’s transfers to the segment, the incentives 
leading to black hole inefficiency become even stronger. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Ineffiziente Umverteilung und ineffiziente Umverteilungspolitik    
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Auswirkung von ineffizienter Umverteilungspolitk im 
Rahmen des Modells von Myerson (1993). Parteien versuchen, Wähler-
segmente für sich zu gewinnen, indem sie ihnen Transferzahlungen zusagen. 
Einzelne Wählersegmente unterscheiden sich in der Effizienz, mit der sich die 
Transferzahlungen einer bestimmten Partei in einen resultierenden Nutzen-
gewinn für den Wähler übersetzen. Für die Parteien entsteht ein Anreiz, 
(stochastisch) Ressourcen hin zu Wählersegmenten zu verlagern, bei denen 
die Transfers von zwei verschiedenen Parteien einen relativ kleinen Unter-
schied in ihrem Effizienzniveau aufweisen, ungeachtet des absoluten Effizienz-
niveaus der Transferzahlung. Aufgrund dieser Abhängigkeit von relativen und 
nicht absoluten Effizienzniveaus können die Gleichgewichtsstrategien der 
Parteien zu großen Unterschieden zwischen der Summe der getätigten 
Transfers und der Summe der effektiv erhaltenen Transfers führen. Im Extrem-
fall erhalten wir „black hole“-Ineffizienz wie in Magee, Brock und Young (1989). 
Eine Erweiterung des Modells um loyale Wählersegmente, bei der Loyalität zu 
einer Partei in positivem Bezug zur Effizienz der von dieser Partei erhaltenen 
Transfers steht, verstärkt die Anreize, die zu „black hole“-Ineffizienz führen.  
21 Introduction
This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson’s (1993) model of
redistributive politics. In this model, political parties attempt to maximize the proportion
of votes that they receive by simultaneously setting offer distributions.1 These distribu-
tions are interpreted as commitments to a schedule of transfers of monetary benefits to the
set of voters, each of whom are assumed to be sincere and vote for the party offering the
highest utility. The set of voters is represented as a continuum of measure one and, when
integrated over this set, each party’s offer distribution must satisfy a common aggregate
budget constraint, interpreted as the budget available to the ruling party.
We extend Myerson’s model by assuming that parties vary in the efficiency with which
they are able to target transfers to different groups of voters. Although some subsets of
the set of voters may be targeted by efficient means by one or both of the parties (in the
sense that $1 of budgeted allocation yields $1 of benefit to a voter), the only way in which
certain subsets of voters may be targeted with transfers is through inefficient means ($1 of
budgeted allocation yields less than $1 benefit). Moreover, we assume that the efficiency
of transfers may vary across both the subset of targeted voters and the identity of the
party making the transfer. Along these lines, we assume that voters may be partitioned
into a finite number of disjoint segments j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, and define θ ji ∈ (0,1] to be the
effective transfer that a voter in segment j receives when party i ∈ {A,B} transfers $1
of the budget to that voter. We call θ ji the efficiency of party i’s transfers to voters in
segment j. The interpretation of these coefficients is that, although the parties are able to
distinguish distinct groups of voters to be targeted, there are constraints on the ability to
transfer $1 directly from the budget to the voter. Often these transfers must be made in
a distortionary manner so that the effective benefit to the targeted voter is less than the
opportunity cost elsewhere. For instance, anticorruption laws and fairness perceptions of
the electorate may make it impossible for a party to promise to take $1 from the budget
and hand it over to a voter in the form of a direct monetary transfer. Instead perhaps, this
dollar might be used as a subsidy that provides an indirect benefit, the provision of a good
or service that costs more than the benefit derived by the voter, or as payment for goods
or services which are not efficient uses of the funds and carry with them a resource cost of
provision. Similar constraints on the efficiency of transfers are assumed directly by Dixit
and Londregan (1995,1996) and indirectly by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).
We characterize the unique Nash equilibrium strategies and vote shares of this model
and demonstrate that the magnitude of the equilibrium expected budgetary transfers of
the two parties to a given set of voters j is determined not by the absolute efficiency of
the two parties’ transfers, but by the relative efficiency of each party’s transfers to each
1 Offer distributions are probability distributions over the nonnegative real numbers with
the interpretation that the measure of a given interval indicates the proportion of voters
receiving a transfer in that interval.
3voter segment. The expected budgetary transfers are the highest to those voter segments
in which the parties have symmetric efficiencies and are strictly decreasing in the “ef-
ficiency gap” between the two parties, which we define by γ(θ jA,θ
j
B) = {max[θ jA,θ jB]−
min[θ jA,θ
j
B]}/max[θ jA,θ jB]. We use our characterization to provide a set of parameterized
examples to demonstrate that the absolute inefficiency of transfers to a given voting block
may not serve as a constraint on the equilibrium budgetary transfers made to that block.
Indeed,we obtain a type of “black hole” inefficiency, first identified by Magee, Brock, and
Young (1989) in in the context of lobbying for protectionist policies. In the context of
our model, black hole inefficiency refers to the fact that redistributive competition with
inefficient transfers can lead to an environment in which a portion of the budget arbitrar-
ily close to one may be conferred to an arbitrarily small portion of the set of voters with
transfers that are arbitrarily inefficient.
We also examine inefficient transfers in our (2008) extension of Myerson’s model to
allow for heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. In that extension, parties may
perfectly discriminate across voters by the party to which they identify and the intensity
of their loyalty to that party. Parties compete by simultaneously setting offer distributions
for each of the finite number of identifiable voter segments under the assumption that
all transfers are efficient. By incorporating differences in the efficiency of transfers across
parties and subsets of targeted voters, and assuming that parties can perfectly discriminate
in transfers by party affiliation, intensity of loyalty to the party, and the efficiency of
transfers to the groups in question, we extend Kovenock and Roberson (2008). In this
extension, the partition of voters into identifiable groups is the meet of the partition into
the two parties’ loyal segments of different intensities and the partition into segments by
the two parties’ efficiency of transfers.
In this context, we show that if the efficiency of party i’s transfers to voters in one of its
own loyal voter segments is greater than that of its rival then, all else equal, an increase in
the efficiency gap for that segment, obtained by either increasing the efficiency of party i’s
transfers to that segment or decreasing the efficiency of the rival party’s transfers, reduces
the expected budgetary transfers of each party to that segment. In this sense, when the
relative efficiency of transfers to a segment and that segment’s loyalty to a party work
together to strengthen one party’s advantage over the other in that segment, the playing
field is made less level and both parties’ expected budgetary transfers to the segment are
reduced. This contrasts, with the results of Dixit and Londregan (1996), who, in a related
setting, find that when a political party’s transfers can be more efficiently targeted at their
loyal voter segments, political parties have an incentive to target a higher level of resources
towards those voters.2
2 In Dixit and Londergan (1996) voters have utilities that are additively separable in
transfers and ideological preferrence, whereas our formulation assumes utilities are mul-
tiplicatively separable in these variables. Moreover, in their formulation parties are unable
to perfectly discriminate across groups by voter attachment or loyalty, but are able to dis-
4Section 2 describes the model. In section 3 we characterize the unique Nash equilib-
rium strategies and vote shares, examine how exogenous redistributive inefficiencies lead
the political parties to pursue inefficient redistribution, and provide an example of black
hole inefficiency. Section 4 extends the model to include heterogeneous voter loyalties
to political parties and demonstrates how the addition of voter loyalties intensifies the
incentive to pursue inefficient redistribution. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The voters are partitioned into a finite number n of disjoint segments indexed by j ∈
{1, . . . ,n}. For each party i ∈ {A,B}, let θ ji ∈ (0,1], which we term the efficiency of party
i’s transfers for voters in segment j, represent the number of units of the homogeneous
good that a voter in segment j receives when party i offers one unit of the homogeneous
good. Thus, the effective transfer that a voter in segment j receives when party i targets
a transfer of xi to that voter is xiθ ji . Each voter segment is distinguished by a unique
pair of efficiencies from each of the parties, {θ jA,θ jB} for each segment j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
The segmentation of voters may be based on characteristics, such as geographic location,
which are symmetric to each party. Alternatively, the segmentation of voters may be based
on characteristics which may or may not be symmetric to each party. For example it may
be the case that one or both of the parties has a finer partition of inefficiencies in some
subset of the electorate. The segmentation described above is applicable in both of these
cases.
Inefficient Redistributive Competition
A strategy, which we label a redistributive schedule (or offer distribution), for party i is
a set of cumulative distribution functions,3 {F ji }nj=1, one distribution function for each
segment j of voters. As in Myerson (1993) each F ji (x) denotes the fraction of voters in
segment j whom party i will offer a transfer less than or equal to x. The only restrictions
that are placed on the set of feasible strategies is that each offer must be nonnegative and
the set of cumulative distribution functions must satisfy the budget constraint:
n
∑
j=1
m j
∫ ∞
0
xdF ji (x)≤ 1. (1)
criminate by efficiency of transfers. Hence the parties engage in a type of third degree
transfer discrimination in determining their redistributive transfers. In contrast, our model
assumes first degree transfer discrimination. Parties are able to perfectly discriminate by
party affiliation, intensity of loyalty to the party and by the efficiency of transfers.
3 In this case the focus is on the distributions within each segment (marginal distribu-
tions) rather than an n-variate joint distribution. An n-variate joint distribution is trivial to
obtain and adds nothing to the problem analyzed here.
5Inefficient Redistributive competition is the one-shot game, which we label
G
({
m j,θ jA,θ
j
B
}n
j=1
)
,
in which parties attempt to maximize their vote share by simultaneously announcing re-
distributive schedules, subject to a budget constraint.
3 Optimal Strategies
The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium of the inefficient redistributive com-
petition game.
Theorem 1 The unique Nash equilibrium of the inefficient redistributive competition game
G({m j,θ jA,θ jB}nj=1) is for each party i to choose offers according to the following distri-
butions.
For party A
∀ j|θ jA > θ jB F jA (x) = xz(θ jB/θ jA) x ∈
[
0,z
(
θ jB
θ jA
)]
∀ j|θ jA = θ jB FSA (x) = xz x ∈ [0,z]
∀ j|θ jA < θ jB F jA (x) = 1−
θ jA
θ jB
+
(
θ jA
θ jB
)
x
z x ∈ [0,z] .
Similarly for party B
∀ j|θ jA < θ jB F jB (x) = xz(θ jA/θ jB) x ∈
[
0,z
(
θ jA
θ jB
)]
∀ j|θ jA = θ jB FSB (x) = xz x ∈ [0,z]
∀ j|θ jA > θ jB F jB (x) = 1−
θ jB
θ jA
+
(
θ jB
θ jA
)
x
z x ∈ [0,z] ,
where z= 2
1−∑
j|θ jA>θ
j
B
m j
(
1−(θ jB/θ jA)
)
−∑
j|θ jA<θ
j
B
m j
(
1−(θ jA/θ jB)
) . In equilibrium, party A’s share
of the vote is
1+∑
j|θ jA>θ
j
B
m j
(
1−(θ jB/θ jA)
)
−∑
j|θ jA<θ
j
B
m j
(
1−(θ jA/θ jB)
)
2 and party B’s share of the vote
is
1−∑
j|θ jA>θ
j
B
m j
(
1−(θ jB/θ jA)
)
+∑
j|θ jA<θ
j
B
m j
(
1−(θ jA/θ jB)
)
2 .
The proof of Theorem 1 follows along lines drawn by Kovenock and Roberson (2008)
which establishes a strategic equivalence between two-party games of redistributive pol-
itics with segmented voters and a unique set of appropriately chosen independent and
simultaneous two-bidder all-pay auctions. The proof of uniqueness then follows from
the arguments appearing in Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries
(1996).
6For intuition on the existence of this equilibrium, note that party A’s vote share from
an arbitrary redistributive schedule, {F¯ jA}nj=1, is
piA
({
F¯ jA ,F
j
B
}n
j=1
)
=
n
∑
j=1
m j
∫ ∞
0
F jB
(
xθ jA
θ jB
)
dF¯ jA (x) .
If Party B is playing the equilibrium redistributive schedule, then it is never a best re-
sponse for a party A to provide offers outside the support of the equilibrium redistributive
schedule. Thus, piA(·) simplifies to
piA
({
F¯ jA ,F
j
B
}n
j=1
)
=
1
z ∑
j|θ jA>θ jB
m j
∫ z(θ jB/θ jA)
0
xdF¯ jA (x)+ ∑
j|θ jA>θ jB
m j
(
1− θ
j
B
θ jA
)
+
1
z ∑
j|θ jA=θ jB
m j
∫ z
0
xdF¯ jA (x)+
1
z ∑
j|θ jA<θ jB
m j
∫ z
0
xdF¯ jA (x) .
But from the budget constraint given in (1) it follows that
piA
({
F¯ jA ,F
j
B
}n
j=1
)
≤
1+∑ j|θ jA>θ jB
m j
(
1− (θ jB/θ jA)
)
−∑ j|θ jA<θ jB m j
(
1− (θ jA/θ jB)
)
2
,
and, thus, party A’s vote share cannot be increased by deviating from the equilibrium
redistributive schedule.
For each segment j in which party i has an efficiency advantage (i.e. θ ji > θ
j
−i), an
important set of terms that appears in Theorem 1 is {(1− (θ j−i/θ ji ))} j|θ ji >θ j−i . In each of
these segments, the term (1− (θ j−i/θ ji )) ∈ [0,1), which we label party i’s efficiency gap
in segment j, provides a measure of the asymmetry in the parties’ efficiencies. Theorem
1 demonstrates that in the game of inefficient redistributive politics the efficiency gaps
determine the nature of redistribution in equilibrium. In particular, the parties concentrate
their resources, by targeting higher expected budgetary transfers, in those segments of
voters in which the parties’ efficiencies are the most symmetric.
Corollary 1 In the inefficient redistributive politics game, G({m j,θ jA,θ jB}nj=1), the ex-
pected budgetary transfers are the highest in those segments of voters in which the parties
have symmetric efficiencies and are strictly decreasing in the efficiency gap.
Proof From Theorem 1, the equilibrium expected budgetary transfer, from each party, for
the segments of voters in which the parties have symmetric efficiencies (i.e. { j|θ jA = θ jB}),
denoted by ES j (·), is
ES j
({
m j,θ jA,θ
j
B
}n
j=1
)
=
1
1−∑ j|θ jA>θ jB m j
(
1− (θ jB/θ jA)
)
−∑ j|θ jA<θ jB m j
(
1− (θ jA/θ jB)
) .
7For each segment j of voters in which party A has an efficiency advantage (i.e. { j|θ jA >
θ jB}) the equilibrium expected budgetary transfer from each party, denoted by EA j (·), is
EA j
({
m j,θ jA,θ
j
B
}n
j=1
)
=
1−
(
1− (θ jB/θ jA)
)
1−∑ j|θ jA>θ jB m j
(
1− (θ jB/θ jA)
)
−∑ j|θ jA<θ jB m j
(
1− (θ jA/θ jB)
) .
Similarly, for each segment j of voters in which party B has an efficiency advantage
(i.e. { j|θ jA < θ jB}) the equilibrium expected budgetary transfer from each party, denoted
by EB j (·), is
EB j
({
m j,θ jA,θ
j
B
}n
j=1
)
=
1−
(
1− (θ jA/θ jB)
)
1−∑ j|θ jA>θ jB m j
(
1− (θ jB/θ jA)
)
−∑ j|θ jA<θ jB m j
(
1− (θ jA/θ jB)
) .
It follows directly that the expected budgetary transfers are the highest in those seg-
ments of voters in which the parties have symmetric efficiencies and are strictly decreasing
in the efficiency gap. Q.E.D.
This result on the expected budgetary transfers extends only partially to the expected
effective transfers. That is, while the expected effective transfers are also the highest in
those segments in which the parties have symmetric efficiencies, it is not the case that
the expected effective transfers are strictly decreasing in the efficiency gap. However,
given that within each voter segment the expected budgetary transfer from each party is
the same, it follows directly that in each voter segment the expected effective transfer is
higher for the party with the efficiency advantage.
Given that the optimal strategy for each party depends only on the efficiency gaps and
not the absolute levels of efficiency, it is clear the incentives of inefficient redistributive
politics may lead the parties to adopt offer distributions which result in unnecessarily large
discrepancies between the sum of the budgetary transfers and the sum of the effective
transfers. The following example demonstrates the extent to which the parties are willing
to forgo the available efficiency in the pursuit of their electoral goals.
Black Hole Inefficiency
Recall that for each party the sum of the budgetary allocations to each of the voters
in each of the segments, referred to as the sum of party i’s budgetary transfers, is 1
(∑nj=1 m j
∫ ∞
0 xdF
j
i = 1). In the discussion that follows, the sum of the transfers from party
i that would actually be received by the voters, ∑nj=1 m j
∫ ∞
0 xθ
j
i dF
j
i ≤ 1, is referred to as
the sum of party i’s effective transfers.
Black Hole Example: Assume that there are only three types of voters: voters
for whom party A has an efficiency advantage, voters for whom party B has an
efficiency advantage, and voters for whom the parties have symmetric efficiencies.
8In the segment of voters for whom party A has an efficiency advantage, denoted as
segment A, let mA = 1−ε2 , θ
A
A = 1, and θ
A
B = θ . Similarly for the segment of voters
for whom party B has an efficiency advantage, denoted as segment B, let mB = 1−ε2 ,
θBB = 1, and θBA = θ . Finally, for the segment of voters for whom the parties have
symmetric efficiencies, denoted as segment S, let mS = ε , and θ SA = θ
S
B = θ .
For i = A,B, party i’s effective transfers are given by
∑
j∈A,B,S
m j
∫ ∞
0
xθ ji dF
j
i =
1− ε
2
(
θ
1− (1− ε)(1−θ)
)
+ ε
(
θ
1− (1− ε)(1−θ)
)
+
1− ε
2
(
θ 2
1− (1− ε)(1−θ)
)
<
θ
1− (1− ε)(1−θ)
Remarkably, the black hole inefficiency example shows that — even if each party has a set
of voters, arbitrarily close to half of the voter population, to whom transfers are perfectly
efficient — the parties optimally pursue unnecessarily inefficient redistribution even to the
point that the sum of the effective transfers goes to zero. That is, for all ε > 0, the sum of
both parties’ effective transfers become arbitrarily small as θ becomes arbitrarily small.
4 Inefficient Redistributive Politics with Party Loyalty
The game of inefficient redistributive politics with party loyalty is a straightforward exten-
sion of the game of inefficient redistributive politics. Let λ ji ∈ (0,1) represent the number
of units of the homogeneous good that party i must offer to a voter in one of its own
segments of loyal voters in order to make that voter indifferent between the two parties
when party −i offers one unit of the homogeneous good and the parties have symmet-
ric inefficiencies.4 Thus, the effective transfer that each loyal voter in party i’s segment
j receives from an offer of xA from party A is xAθ
j
A if i = B and xAθ
j
A/λ
j
A if i = A. For
each segment j of voters loyal to party i, let θ˜ ji ≡ θ ji /λ ji denote the effective efficiency of
party i’s transfers to loyal voter segment j. Similarly, for each segment j of voters which
are not loyal to party i, let θ˜ ji ≡ θ ji denote the effective efficiency of party i’s transfers
to non-loyal voter segment j. It seems reasonable to assume that each party has an effec-
tive efficiency advantage in each of its own loyal voter segments (i.e., for each segment
j of voters loyal to party i θ˜ ji > θ˜
j
−i). While it is possible that the parties have asym-
metric effective efficiencies in the segments of voters which are not loyal to either party
(henceforth the swing voter segments), the following analysis focuses on the case in which
the parties have symmetric effective efficiencies in the swing voter segments. Lastly, let
(1− (θ˜ j−i/θ˜ ji )) ∈ [0,1), denote the effective efficiency gap in segment j of party i’s loyal
voters.
4 This type of effectiveness advantage is frequently used in the literature on unfair con-
tests, see for example Lein (1990), Clark and Riis (2000), Konrad (2002), and Sahuguet
and Persico (2006).
9One possible outcome of the game of inefficient redistributive politics with party loy-
alty is a ‘machine politics’ outcome in which each party’s expected budgetary transfers
are the highest in their own loyal voter segments and are in increasing in the effective
efficiency gap. If a party’s core loyal voters have the largest effective efficiency gaps, then
this outcome may be interpreted as an effort by the parties to reward their core loyal vot-
ers. An alternative outcome is a ‘swing voter’ outcome in which each party’s expected
budgetary transfers are the highest for the swing voters and are decreasing in the effective
efficiency gap. In this outcome the parties leverage the loyalty of their core loyal voters in
an effort to win over swing and, to some extent, the opposition party’s loyal voters.
The equilibrium of the game of inefficient redistributive politics with party loyalty is
a straightforward extension of Theorem 1 in which for each party i and segment j θ ji is
replaced by θ˜ ji . As highlighted in the following Corollary, the equilibrium of the game
of inefficient redistributive politics with party loyalty is consistent with the swing voter
outcome.
Corollary 2 In the inefficient redistributive politics game with party loyalty, the expected
budgetary transfers are the highest in the swing voter segments and are strictly decreasing
in the efficiency gap.
The proof of Corollary 2 follows directly from Corollary 1 in which each θ ji is replaced
by θ˜ ji . As was the case with Corollary 1, this result on the expected budgetary transfers
extends only partially to the expected effective transfers. Within each segment of loyal
voters, the affiliated party’s expected effective transfer is higher than that of the oppo-
sition party. In addition, across the voter segments loyal to given a party, the affiliated
party’s expected effective transfers are strictly increasing in the opposition party’s effec-
tive efficiency.
Dixit and Londregan (1996) examine a related model in which parties are unable per-
fectly discriminate across groups by voter attachment or loyalty, but are able to discrimi-
nate by efficiency of transfers. Hence the parties engage in a type of third degree transfer
discrimination in determining their redistributive transfers. In that setting, Dixit and Lon-
dregan (1996) find that when a political party can more efficiently target transfers to their
loyal voter segments than to the swing or opposition party’s loyal voters, political parties
have an incentive to pursue a ‘machine politics’ outcome (i.e., target a higher level of
resources towards their own loyal voters).
In contrast, our model assumes first degree transfer discrimination. Parties are able to
perfectly discriminate by party affiliation, intensity of loyalty to the party and the effi-
ciency of transfers. We find that comparisons of the absolute efficiency of transfers across
segments are irrelevant. Instead, it is the effective efficiency gaps that determine the na-
ture of redistribution in equilibrium. Furthermore, under the assumption that each party’s
core loyal voters have the highest effective efficiency gaps, political parties have an incen-
tive to target a lower level of resources towards these core loyal voters. That is, effective
10
efficiency gaps create an incentive for political parties to (stochastically) shift resources
away from their own loyal voters towards the swing voters. The intuition for this result
is straightforward. Larger effective efficiency gaps in a party’s own loyal voter segments
make it more difficult for the opposing party to steal voters away. As the level of the oppo-
sition party’s stealing, or ‘poaching’, of a party’s own loyal voters decreases, resources can
be (stochastically) shifted away from that party’s own loyal voters to the swing voter seg-
ments, in which the parties have symmetric efficiencies. Lastly, it is important to note that
when party loyalty is positively correlated with the efficiency of transfers the incentives
leading to black hole inefficiency may be exacerbated: both parties target most of their
resources to the most hotly contested segments, which are both less loyal and involve less
efficient transfers.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in a simple model of redistribu-
tive politics. In equilibrium, we find that, regardless of the absolute levels of the efficiency
of transfers to different voter segments, political parties have incentive to (stochastically)
shift resources away from voter segments with large relative efficiency gaps towards voter
segments with smaller relative efficiency gaps. A large relative efficiency gap makes it
more difficult for the party with the efficiency disadvantage to win votes in that segment
of voters and, as a result, both parties (stochastically) shift resources to the more com-
petitive segments in which the efficiency gaps are smaller. Because of the dependence on
relative, and not absolute, levels of efficiency, the parties’ optimal strategies may lead to
large discrepancies between the sum of budgetary transfers and the sum of the effective
transfers. At the extreme, a “black hole” inefficiency example (in the spirit of Magee,
Brock, and Young, 1989) shows that — even though each party may have a set of vot-
ers arbitrarily close to half of the electorate to whom transfers are perfectly efficient —
the sum of effective transfers in each party’s optimal redistribution schedule may be ar-
bitrarily close to zero. Furthermore, when the model is extended to allow for loyal voter
segments and a segment’s loyalty to a party is positively related to the efficiency of that
party’s transfers to the segment, the incentives leading to black hole inefficiency become
even stronger.
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